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ABSTRACT
Singapore is a country with the lowest corruption rate in 
Asia. In the last two decades, the amount of data and facts 
released by international agencies such as Transparency 
International and The Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy show this its entirety. This paper tries 
to describe the determinant aspect in eradicating 
corruption; how the strategy of eradicating corruption; 
and also recognizes the steps and strategies of corruption 
eradication experience in Singapore that can be “lesson-
learned” by other countries especially Indonesia. Based 
on existing precedents and postulates, it can be concluded 
that an entry point for eradicating corruption in Singapore 
stems from strong political support (strong leadership) of 
party elites, government and society, as well as increased 
official incentives and public institutional reconstruction 
efforts.
I. Introduction
Corruption is a crucial issue that impedes economic 
development, infrastructure, and even social welfare in the 
Asian regional scope (Quah, 2001: 29). This hypothesis is 
emphasized by Mauro in his research which shows some 
implications of corruption. First, corruption weakens 
investments that have an impact through economic growth. 
Second, nepotism is the antithesis of the merit system which 
leads to “talent miss allocated” or in its simplest form is the 
placement of apparatus who doesn’t based on performance 
and capabilities. Third, state funding allocations does not 
work properly if there is corrupt behavior. Finally, tax 
evasion often found in typologies of corruption that has 
implications for the significance of the quantity and quality 
of the provision of public goods and services (Mauro, 
1997: 12-17).
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This trend can be measured from research 
data reported by international institutions that 
have a main office in Berlin. Transparency 
International (TI), in the Corruption Perception 
Index from 1996 to 1999 showed that of the 
16 countries in Asia that were survey samples, 
only 5 countries included Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia that were 
able to eradicate and reduce corruption in their 
countries each. In addition, the consistency of 
ranking as the “cleanest” country that Singapore 
obtained in the past five years. This can be 
measured through the findings and publications 
released by international institutions below.
Table 1. Country Rating with the Corruption Perception Index, from the Cleanest to the 
Most Corrupt in Asia. (With 12 Countries Becoming Samples)
Countries Ranking
Singapura 1
Hongkong 2
Jepang 3
Malaysia 4
Taiwan 5
Korea Selatan 6
Filiphina 7
Thailand 8
China 9
India 10
Indonesia 11
Pakistan 12
Source: Quah, 2001: by quoting various reports from Transparency International
Table 2. Singapore Corruption Rank Based on the Last Five Years Survey
Last Five Year of Corruption Perception Index
Year Singapore WorldRank Score
Asian Country
(Indonesia)
2012 5 87 Rank 118, Score 32
2013 5 86 Rank 114, Score 32
2014 7 84 Rank 107, Score 34
2015 7 85 Rank 88, Score 36
2016 7 84 Rank 90, Score 37
Source : Transparency International
Based on the table above, it can be 
concluded that Singapore’s consistency as the 
country with the lowest level of corruption in 
the Asian region over the past 5 years even 
during the past decade since 1996 until now, 
can be maintained by corruption eradication 
institutions in Singapore (Quah, 2001: 29-30). 
This is the main reason the author takes the 
theme of eradicating corruption in Singapore. 
In addition, the study of eradicating corruption 
in Singapore is being interesting, because the 
Singapore government’s leadership capability 
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in reconstructing its community paradigm 
towards corrupt culture and behavior. In 
the colonial periodization, the paradigm of 
corruption as a “way of life” in carrying out 
daily life was successfully shifted into a “fact 
of life” that must be solved and eradicated in 
all sectors (Caiden 1981: 58-63). Both in the 
public and private sectors. Finally, consciously, 
the Singaporean community considers that 
the implications of corruption are very broad 
impacting on the deterioration of economic, 
political, infrastructure, and community 
welfare development (Liom Siong Guan, 2014: 
133-134).
The design of this study is a descriptive 
analysis method that describes how leadership 
aspects as entry points in eradicating corruption 
and the development of a culture of anti-fraud 
systems in Singapore. The data sources based 
from a literature review of the research and ideas 
of Jon S. Quah about eradicating corruption 
in Singapore. Data collection techniques take 
from a literature review and draft in the form 
of journals, scientific works, and research 
produced by Jon S. Quah.
A. Determinan Factors for Corruption of 
Colonial Period Corruption
Like several countries in Asia, Singapore 
also has a historical record as a colony in the 
past, where Japan and the United Kingdom 
once planted their influence there. By him, 
understanding the determinants of corruption in 
Singapore, this paper will refer to various data, 
manuscripts, and monographs written by Jon 
S. Q Quah. There are two main factors behind 
the corruption in Singapore during the colonial 
era, namely the lack of political commitment 
from the government and the inefficiency of 
the strategy to eradicate corruption reflected in 
the process of investigation and evidence that 
is not optimal as well as mild legal sanctions by 
perpetrators and task forces. formed a colonial 
government (Quah, 2001 29-30).
During the colonial administration, 
corruption in Singapore massively occurred 
in the police agency. This was evident in 1879 
when the government established a commission 
and task force aimed at investigating reports of 
corrupt actions and institutional inefficiencies 
under the Singapore Police Force (SPF) 
(Strait Times, from 1985-1921). The results 
of the investigation indicate the existence of 
corrupt practices involving senior and junior 
officials at the SPF institution. Furthermore, 
in 1886 similar commissions and task forces 
were formed to cope with corrupt actions in 
the same agency. From witness testimony and 
data found it proved the involvement of the 
SPF in accommodating illegal gambling that 
occurred in the Straits Settlement. In fact, these 
corrupt actions are arranged systematically and 
holistically by SPF officials (Quah, 1979: 24-
25).
Although the colonial government had 
designed the formation of several commissions 
and task forces in 1879 and 1886, it did not 
simultaneously reduce corruption in Singapore 
(Krishna, 1939: 307-309). This trend is only 
permissive and far from preventive action 
based on the findings of previous corruption 
cases. Departing from this, Quah emphasized 
that the political commitment of the British 
colonial government was very low in relation 
to the prevention and eradication of corruption. 
Also, the form of omission was transformed 
during the postponement of the anti-corruption 
Act of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 
(POCO) in 1937. Furthermore, the purpose of 
establishing the commission and task force was 
only political by the British colonial government 
(Quah, 2015: 141 -142). In fact, Quah identified 
three attentions underlying the formation. First, 
this commission aims to shape the image of 
colonial government elites in the eyes of the 
United Kingdom. Secondly, this commission 
was used as a tool to attack and discredit the 
opposition. Third, this commission also works 
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to accommodate government interests in cases 
handled (Quah, 2015: 142).
The lack of political commitment from 
the colonial government to eradicate corruption 
and the permissive attitude of the government 
affected the effectiveness of commissions 
and task forces formed and endorsed by the 
Singapore constitution. This can be observed 
based on work mechanisms and systems as 
outlined in several regulations and articles 
contained in POCO. There are two issues that 
make inefficiencies in eradicating corruption in 
the SPF body.
First, the issue of evidence of violations 
of criminal acts of corruption that cannot be 
confiscated by the commission or task force 
given authority. Also, the authority in the form 
of investigation, interception, investigation, and 
arrest is very limited so that it does not provide 
flexibility in the process of investigating 
corruption cases whose content and context 
are very serious and massive. Second, from 
the aspect of legal sanctions which tend to be 
mild and do not cause a deterrent effect for 
corruptors. The duration of legal sanctions 
imposed on perpetrators is only valid for two 
years and the amount of the fine is only around 
$ 10,000 (Quah, 2015: 141-142).
In addition, inefficiencies also occur 
in the institutional structure of the Anti-
Corruption Branch (ACB), which is the 
spearhead of eradicating corruption in this era. 
It is noted, there are three aspects in which 
strategies and steps to eradicate corruption 
that cause inefficiency and are slow. First, the 
limited number of ACB human resources is 
only 17. In terms of quantity, this will certainly 
burden the tasks and strategies in combating 
and cracking down on widespread and rampant 
corruption in SCS and SCF agencies. Second, 
the institutional structure of the ACB is under 
the auspices of the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) division, which is tasked 
and functionally handles and detects crimes 
of the conventional type; maintain public 
order, fraud, illegal gambling, brokers, etc. 
And extraordinary crimes; narcotics, human, 
weapons trade etc. (Quah, 2015: 142-143). 
This means that, ACB’s focus is not only on 
prevention and eradication of corruption, 
but CID duties are also the responsibility of 
ACB officers. The issue of overlap between 
ACB and CID is what causes inefficiencies 
in strategies and steps to eradicate corruption. 
Third, as mentioned above, the most corrupt 
institution in Singapore is in the SFC. The 
form of inefficiency lies in the prevalence of 
corruption within the police force. At that time, 
the corrupt actions of the police had become 
public secrets and seemed to be permissive to 
the colonial government. Although the data 
and facts of corruption are clearly discovered 
by commissions and task forces that have been 
formed, there is no firm action and political 
support for sanctions imposed on corruptors 
(Quah, 2015: 142-143).
Nevertheless, it was finally discovered 
that several stakeholders such as the ACB 
Commissioner and senator Elizabeth Choi gave 
political demands and pressure to the colonial 
government to amend the POCO, increase the 
quantity of ACB human resources, and give 
ACB autonomy rights along with institutional 
structure with SPF so that independence. 
The implications of political support for 
the effectiveness of corruption eradication 
strategies can be observed in the table below.
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Table 3. Matrix of Anti Corruption Strategy
Source: Jon S.T. Quah, “Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Their Anti- 
Corruption Strategies,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 13 (1, March 1982): 175, Table 4.
Based on the matrix in table 3 in the 
first slot, it illustrates that if political support 
from leaders or governments against corruption 
eradication is strong and is supported by 
integrated, planned and holistic strategies and 
steps of anti-corruption agencies, an effective 
and efficient corruption eradication process can 
be realized. Based on the Quah comparative 
study in six Asian countries, this trend indicates 
that political support along with the integrity 
of anti-corruption institutions through a 
capable strategy is realized in countries such 
as Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong (Quah, 
1982: 175).
Furthermore, according to Quah, 
eradicating corruption in a country can be 
done if the government implements various 
strategies and preventive measures through 
state institutions, in this case the corruption 
eradication agency. However, even though the 
strategy formulated and implemented is so good, 
integrated and holistic if it is not accompanied by 
strong political support by multi-stakeholders, 
it will hamper the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the agency and eradicate corruption itself. 
Also, from the strong political support will give 
the significance of authority and authority in 
eradicating corruption through the legislative 
process (Quah, 1982: 174-175). Therefore, 
one of the most potential preconditions in 
eradicating corruption in government entities is 
political commitment from various stakeholders 
and must be accompanied by an integrated and 
holistic corruption eradication strategy from 
anti-corruption agencies.
In addition to low political commitment, 
during colonial periodization, the factual 
conditions that occur in the police institution 
that encourage corrupt behavior lie in the aspects 
of honorarium and incentives. For example, a 
low level of income for police with brigadier 
positions only ranges from $ 4 to $ 15 per 
month (Quah, 1979: 29). This is also explained 
by Palmier, that one of the main factors causing 
corruption is the low employee incentives 
that allow them to abuse their authority and 
authority for personal gain (Palmier, 1985: 
2.6). Furthermore, Paulo Mauro emphasized 
that when the honorarium and incentives of the 
State Civil Service (ASN) are low, they will use 
their authority to carry out a bribery process in 
order to increase their personal financial coffers 
(Mauro, 1975: 5). Then, working conditions 
that are not conducive such as the absence of 
work uniform and operational accommodation 
make it more difficult for these officers to 
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finance their daily lives. Therefore, the above 
objective conditions encourage and allow 
police to commit corrupt acts such as accepting 
bribes from illegal gambling and seeking 
additional income outside of police duties that 
are legally prohibited in Singapore. For more 
details, the following data on the amount of 
SPF honorarium during colonial regime.
Table 4. Monthly Income since 1887 
Colonial Police Force Period
Source: Quah on Straits Times, 4 October 1987.
Furthermore, even though massive 
cases of corruption occur in the police 
institution, it does not necessarily nullify acts 
of corruption in the sector of the public and 
private institutions. So, in this era corruption 
has become “the way of life” in the community 
entities and public officials. Institutions such as 
the Customs Office, Immigration, Taxes, etc. 
are also not spared from racial practices. The 
granting of permits, concessions and even tax 
evasion and bribery systems by officials and the 
public is proven to be carried out in all sectors.
B. SINGAPORE’S CORRUPTION 
ERADICATION STRATEGY
The corruption that occurred so 
massively during the colonial periodization 
did not dampen the intention of the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) in eradicating corruption. 
Since occupying the government in 1959, 
they have realized that in ensuring sustainable 
development in Singapore, there needs to be a 
constructive transformation process from the 
strategy to eradicate corruption that has been 
applied by the colonial government (Quah, 
2001: 32). By referring to these facts, the 
task encountered by the PAP leadership was 
to minimize the opportunities for officials to 
commit corruption and change the perceptions 
and perspectives of the community towards 
corruption from the “way of life” to “fact of 
life”. The concrete and comprehensive step 
taken by the PAP leaders in 1960 was to enact 
regulations that were outlined in the Prevention 
of Corruption Act (POCA) which would later 
strengthen the “power” of the Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) anti-corruption 
institution (Quah, 20014: 2). In addition, 
designing measures that are considered capable 
of controlling corruption behavior and closing 
opportunities for corruption in the public and 
private sectors by increasing remuneration and 
incentive for officials.
B.1  Reducing Corruption Opportunities
After World War II, like countries 
in Europe, Asia also experienced economic 
instability including Singapore. In 1960, 
Singapore had a low gross national product 
(GNP) level of around 1,330 Singapore dollars 
or if it was converted into the American 
exchange rate of 443 dollars (Encyclopedia 
Singapore, 1986: 9). This condition prevents the 
government from increasing the remuneration 
of the State Civil Apparatus so that the initial 
step focuses on strengthening regulations and 
legislation to reduce the chances of corruption 
occurring while increasing legal sanctions for 
racial offenders which can have implications 
for the perception and deterrent effects of 
corruption.
In its development, there are five 
important aspects that are regulated in POCA so 
that it significantly reduces POCO inefficiencies 
and provides institutional strengthening and 
tasks and functions of the CPIB. First, the 
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regulations contained in POCA have a wider 
scope than POCO. It was noted, there were 
32 then increasing to 37 articles formulated 
in POCA while in POCO itself during the 
colonial periodization only 12 articles. Second, 
the definition of corruption is increasingly 
progressive under the leadership and 
commissioners of the CPIB. The terminology 
of corruption is increasingly being expanded 
which accommodates “gratification” as part of 
acts of corruption. This is stated in article 2 of 
POCA. Third, improve corruption prevention 
through the addition of legal sanctions and fines 
for corruptors for 5 years in prison and a fine of 
10,000 Singapore dollars (article 5 POCA), then 
in its most recent development rose by 100,000 
Singapore dollars in 1989. Fourth, public, 
private, and people who are legally proven to 
accept bribes and gratuities are obliged to return 
them later plus appropriate punishment as a 
court decision (Article 13 POCA). Fifth, give 
authority and “power” to CPIB in eradicating 
corruption. For example, in article 15 POCA 
grants the authority of the CPIB to arrest and 
hunt down fugitive suspects. In addition, in 
article 17, CPIB leaders and commissioners are 
given the authority to investigate accounts and 
bank accounts of parties suspected of having 
potential corruption. Article 18 also gives the 
authority to periodically inspect the personal 
accounts of ASN and their families. This 
means that, the fifth aspect of POCA’s reforms 
is strengthening CPIB in eradicating corruption 
(Quah, 2001: 33).
In ensuring the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the CPIB, the PAP also takes 
an innovative step from year to year beyond the 
scope of POCA by amending legislation that is 
deemed important to be revised. In 1963, the 
PAP amended the function of witnesses in the 
court. This step is intended so that witnesses 
can cooperatively provide information to 
investigators (Quah, 2001: 33).
There are two main amendments that 
were very useful in 1966 regarding measures 
to eradicate corruption. First, the amendment 
to Article 28 which states that a person can 
be found guilty of a criminal act of corruption 
even though he does not really accept the 
bribe, if he has the intention and awareness to 
enter the system or mechanism of corruption. 
Second, citizens who work as government 
agents outside the country will still be tried as 
a legal system that applies in Singapore if they 
are legally proven to be corrupt (Quah, 1978: 
13).
Furthermore, in 1981, the PAP 
incrementally amended the POCA article to 
affirm sanctions and increase the deterrent 
effect on perpetrators of corruption by the 
mechanism of returning compensation for all 
proven corrupt money and snares and legal 
sanctions decided in court. If restitution cannot 
be fulfilled, legal sanctions will be doubled. 
Also, the imposition of confiscation of benefits 
imposed by the CPIB investigative commission 
on March 3, 1989. This mechanism of 
restitution and legal sanctions proved effective 
in providing a deterrent effect on corruptors.
Facts found in Singapore on the suicide 
case of Singapore’s National Development 
Minister Cheang Wan Tea. Minister Teh 
reportedly committed suicide 12 days after the 
CPIB commissioner interrogated him which 
led to two accusations by the witness of a 
contrordor. The Minister of Tea was charged 
with two bribery cases in 1981 and 1982. Where 
he each received bribes from the Developer 
for 1 million Singapore dollars to give land 
concessions. (Singapore, 1987: 1-37).
CPIB plays an important role in 
enforcing the regulations stipulated in the 
POCA articles. In terms of institutional posture, 
the agency’s personnel have several additional 
personnel. Until 1960, there were 71 personnel 
consisting of 49 investigators and 22 support 
staff. Even so, CPIB does not require a large 
quantity of personnel and institutional size such 
as anti-racial institutions based in Hong Kong, 
ICAC. Because the CPIB itself, in addition 
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to its authority, is also within the scope and 
location of the prime minister’s office which 
enables the CPIB to coordinate and collaborate 
with stakeholders from both the private sector 
and the public sector. Thus, it can help the 
CPIB handle cases of corruption responsively 
that occurred in the public and private sectors 
at that time.
In general, there are three tasks and 
functions of the CPIB. First, receive reports and 
investigate corruption cases in the private and 
public sectors. Second, examine administrative 
errors either intentionally or not that allow 
corrupt actions to occur. Third, examine public 
service practices and procedures to minimize 
opportunities that lead to corrupt actions.
B.2 Civil Servant Remunerations
The preconditions that have been 
established by the PAP by designing the 
institutional independence of the CPIB as well 
as implementing incremental amendments 
do not reduce the focus of the government to 
improve and improve in eradicating corruption. 
In March 1972, steps to increase remuneration 
for SCS apparatus were immediately followed 
up. This step is assessed to improve the 
performance and integrity of employees and be 
able to have implications for the conduciveness 
of the work environment. (Quah, 1984: 296). 
This trend was fully supported by Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew in every state speech 
and national and international conference. 
He stated that one of the effective measures 
to eradicate corruption was to increase the 
incentives of politicians and state officials and 
the ASN to create an honest, clean and open 
government for multi-stakeholders. (Straits 
Times, 1985: 14-16).
Furthermore, the remuneration step 
proposed by the government is increasing 
employee salaries on par with the private 
sector and also reconstructing the working 
environment of the ASN. The conduciveness 
of the work environment in question includes 
work systems adopted from the private 
sector that are performance-based or in the 
realm of public administration called New 
Public Management. Significant increases 
in remuneration occurred in the 1973, 1979, 
1982, 1989, and 1994 periods whose salary 
levels were equivalent to the private sector. 
It was noted, the data released from a White 
Paper on Competitive Salaries for Competent 
and Honest Government in 1994 showed the 
equalization of salary amounts between ASN 
and the private sector in 6 professional sectors 
such as Accountants, Banking, Engineering, 
Lawyers, Manufacturing, and Multinational 
Companies. Just look at the table below which 
illustrates the significant amount of incentives 
after the colonial administration ended.
Table 5. The Amount of Singaporean Civil 
Servant
Source: Quah, 2001in Public Service Comission
C. Lesson Learn for Indonesia
There are various lessons that can 
be learned by various countries in the world, 
especially Indonesia, which can be transformed 
into eradication strategies by anti-corruption 
institutions. Although there are two aspects 
that might not be possible to be adopted 
related to the strategy to eradicate corruption 
in Singapore. First, all countries have their own 
distinctions and differences from the context of 
historical, economic, political, demographic, 
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and even geographical backgrounds. Secondly, 
when referring to Singapore’s experience in 
eradicating corruption where the country is 
spending a lot of money in accommodating the 
honorarium of politicians and the State Civil 
Apparatus, certainly not all countries have 
stable capacity and economic growth, especially 
in some developing countries. Nevertheless, at 
least some of the steps and strategies formulated 
by Quah below, can be used as references and 
become the best standards or best practices in 
implementing strategies to eradicate corruption 
in other countries, especially Indonesia.
First, strong political commitment 
(Strong Leadership). Singapore was able to 
eradicate corruption after the end of the colonial 
government because of the full support of 
the elite and PAP political party leaders. This 
form of political support is to try racial agents 
indiscriminately and selectively. Whatever 
position and background of corruptors, both 
high and low officials must be tried with the 
applicable legal provisions. In Indonesia itself 
after the New Order regime, relatively high 
political commitment was given to the Habibi 
government through Law No. 31 of 1999 
concerning the administration of a country free 
from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Also, 
President Abdurrahman Wahid legitimized 
the establishment of the Joint Corruption 
Eradication Team (RGPTK) which would 
later become the embryo of the establishment 
of the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) and received support and struggle for 
anti-corruption activists such as Indonesian 
Corruption Watch, anti-corruption NGOs, and 
institutions affiliates. So that it was known 
further, that the KPK was formed and legitimized 
in the Megawati Soekarno Putri government. 
Even so, after the KPK was formed, several 
parliamentary elites, the police, and even the 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government 
themselves did not consistently show their 
political commitment in combating corruption 
in Indonesia. This can be proven through 
cases of officials from government circles, 
parliament, and the family of the President 
who were involved in corruption at that time. 
In fact, in the most recent cases such as the 
dissolution and “conciliation” movement of the 
KPK through the questionnaire “inquiry rights” 
initiated by parliament, it was increasingly 
emphasized that political commitment by elites 
and leaders to eradicate corruption had not 
shown seriousness and firmness.
Second, a comprehensive and effective 
corruption eradication strategy. Corruption is 
a case with a very complex scope, by which a 
comprehensive, integrated and holistic strategy 
is needed. Strategic steps in the form of 
controlling the effectiveness of regulations and 
legislation related to corruption. If regulations 
and laws are deemed not to resolve corruption 
cases, amendments and changes are a 
necessity and must be carried out. Referring to 
Singapore’s experience, the articles contained 
in the POCA incrementally underwent 
changes following the obstacles to eradicating 
corruption cases that occurred. Whereas in 
Indonesia, the senators in the parliament have 
an interest in dissolving the KPK through the 
movement carried out by the leadership of the 
honorable state institution. Not to mention, the 
formation of a special committee for the KPK 
Questionnaire will only interfere with the focus 
on eradicating increasingly complex corruption, 
especially in cases of alleged corruption in the 
Electronic Population Identity Card (E-KTP) 
project which has been public attention to 
date. In the context of the strategy to eradicate 
corruption, according to the author’s view, the 
KPK has integrated, planned and holistic steps 
and strategies so far. One of the breakthroughs 
was that the KPK launched a pocket book on 
the criteria of corruption that could become 
the grip of the community and all stakeholders 
so that knowledge about corruption could be 
widespread in the archipelago.
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Third, the credibility of anti-corruption 
institutions. Becoming a credible and trusted 
institution requires values and attitudes in the 
form of integrity, honesty, professionalism, and 
independence in the person of the anti-racial 
institution itself. All institutions and employees 
both vertically and horizontally affiliated 
with anti-corruption bodies must be free from 
corruption trends. By him, a recruitment system 
is needed based on the merit system and also the 
independence of state officials especially the 
Prime Minister and the President. In the case of 
the effectiveness of corruption eradication that 
occurred in Singapore, since the government 
was taken over by the PAP under the leadership 
of Lee Kuan Yew, this Prime Minister through 
his authority appointed individuals who would 
occupy strategic positions at CPIB. It becomes 
interesting, because even though the Prime 
Minister has the authority to appoint CPIB 
officials directly, but does not impulsively 
have the authority to regulate the direction of 
this anti-racial institution policy. This means 
that the independence and credibility of the 
CPIB can still be accounted for. In Indonesia, 
the credibility and integrity of KPK officials 
and employees is very good. Even so, it 
was noted that there were a number of track 
records of national phenomena which showed 
the existence of leaders and several KPK 
commissioners who had been involved in 
criminal acts because they were criminalized 
by party elites, elite police institutions, even 
the government in the administration period of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
III. Conclusion
Based on the explanation above, it can 
be concluded that combating corruption is a 
process that continues to dwell and continue. 
The state to be corruption-free and clean must 
be supported by strong political commitment 
from all stakeholders especially the head of 
government and party elite and accompanied 
by teaching and practicing the attitudes and 
behavior of public and community officials 
so that the corruption paradigm as a “way of 
life” can be shifted to “Fact of life” that must 
be resolved in order to lead life and mutual 
prosperity. Singapore’s change is what it is 
today thanks to the political commitment of 
PAP leaders and heads of government under 
Lee Kuan Yew who are able to legitimize CPIB 
against independence, integrity and credibility 
in combating corruption indiscriminately and 
shifting the cultural paradigm and ethics of 
corruption to public officials and Singaporeans. 
For Indonesia, if elites and public officials can 
commit and firmly eradicate corruption through 
full support of the KPK, it is not impossible 
that Indonesia will be free from corruption. The 
last but not the least, quoting Mahatma Gandhi, 
“the Earth is sufficient to serve human needs, 
but not enough to fulfill human greed.”
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